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Well-anchored inflation expectations are a key factor for achieving economic
stability. This paper provides new empirical results on the anchoring of
long-term inflation expectations in the euro area. In line with earlier evidence,
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1. Introduction
There is a growing consensus among both, central bankers and academics that well-
anchored inflation expectations are a key factor for achieving economic stability. Conse-
quently, inflation expectations are increasingly used as an indicator for the credibility of
monetary policy and the central bank’s inflation target. In the empirical literature, the pre-
dominant criterion to test the anchoring of inflation expectations is based on the idea that
firmly anchored expectations should be insensitive to the announcement of macroeconomic
news, see e.g. Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2010b). If long-term inflation expectations remain unaf-
fected by incoming economic surprises, economic agents apparently trust the ability of the
central bank to maintain its inflation target in spite of the unexpected economic develop-
ments. By contrast, if the credibility of the central bank is only weak and inflation expec-
tations are de-anchored, surprises in macroeconomic announcements can lead to unwanted
changes in expectations, away from the given inflation target.
Many central banks have adopted an inflation-targeting system as a tool for anchoring
long-term inflation expectations.1 A leading example is the European Central Bank (ECB)
which is very clear about her inflation target of ”below, but close to 2%”.2 In the aftermath
of the financial crisis and, particularly, during the following European sovereign debt crisis,
there has been a heated debate about the credibility of the ECB’s inflation target. Galati
et al. (2011) and Autrup and Grothe (2014) show that inflation expectations in the euro area
are well-anchored. However, these results are based on data ending March 2009 and July
2012, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, more recent evidence on the anchoring of
long-term inflation expectations in the euro area is not available. The current paper tries
to fill this gap by providing new empirical evidence on the impact of the recent European
sovereign debt crisis on inflation expectations anchoring in the euro area.
1During the financial crisis, inflation targeting has often been blamed for preventing monetary authorities from
appropriately responding to financial systemic risk. Recent evidence shows, however, that inflation targeting
countries have, on average, a more stable financial system, see Fazio et al. (2015).
2Inflation targets are used by an increasing number of central banks all over the world. The information about
the target is, however, provided in very different ways. For example, there are several central banks, includ-
ing the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England, or the Bank of Sweden, that have published
their intended level of the inflation rate for many years. By contrast, the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) had only
an implicit inflation targeting regime without an explicit, numerically expressed inflation target up till the
end of January 2012.
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In the course of the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis, the challenges for monetary
policy have increased tremendously. After Mario Draghi’s announcement in July 2012 that
the ECB would do ”whatever it takes” to save the Euro (Draghi, 2012), government bond
yields stopped rising but economic risks remained high in several euro area countries. As
a consequence, more unconventional monetary policy measures followed. In order to stabi-
lize markets and engage investment activity, the ECB changed its communication strategy
by implementing forward guidance in July 2013, thereby breaking with a long-kept tradition
to never pre-commit to a future interest rate path (ECB, 2014). Interest rates were lowered
continually, reaching negative deposit facility rates and a fixed refinancing rate as low as
0.05% in October 2014. Finally, the ECB announced the implementation of a quantitative-
easing (asset purchase) program, feeding a monthly amount of e 60 billion into European
markets until March 2016, see ECB (2012b).
Interestingly, the direction of the effect of the crisis-related uncertainty on inflation expec-
tations is not obvious. On the one hand, the vast amount of additional liquidity provided
by the ECB may lead to expectations that inflation will rise above 2% eventually. On the
other hand, the possibility that currently very low or even negative inflation rates induce a
deflationary spiral could trigger strong downward corrections of inflation expectations. In
either case, inflation expectations in the euro area would be less anchored, reacting more
sensitively to macroeconomic news.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we examine whether there has been a recent de-
anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area. And second, if that is the case, we test
whether inflation expectations have been successfully re-anchored ever since. Following
Nautz and Strohsal (2015), we address these questions by applying the multiple endoge-
nous break point tests of Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998). In accordance with Galati
et al. (2011) and Autrup and Grothe (2014), our empirical results show that the sensitivity
of euro area inflation expectations to macroeconomic news is only weak until September
2011. However, the break point tests and the corresponding news regression clearly demon-
strate that euro area inflation expectations have been de-anchored ever since. These results
indicate that the credibility of the ECB’s inflation target has suffered significantly from the
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protracted European sovereign debt crisis and that it has not been re-established so far.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on
inflation expectations anchoring. Section 3 discusses the measurement of inflation expec-
tations and introduces the data employed for macroeconomic news. Section 4 presents the
empirical results based on news-regressions and endogenous break tests. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2. Anchoring of Inflation Expectations in the Euro Area:
A Brief Review of the Literature
A natural starting point for a review of the literature on inflation expectations anchoring
is Friedmann (1961). He already emphasized that there are lags in the consequences of
monetary policy actions implying that they should be based on expectations about future
inflation and not on current inflation. Until recently, a characteristic feature of traditional
economic theory has been the assumption of rational expectations that are based on a fixed
and known structure of the economy. In these models, surprises about macroeconomic vari-
ables can only lead to transitory deviations of the inflation rate from its target level implying
that macroeconomic news do not affect long-run inflation expectations.
The impact of macroeconomic news on inflation expectations increases, however, if eco-
nomic agents are uncertain about the model’s structure, its time invariance or some of its
parameters. Orphanides and Williams (2005) propose a model where agents have only im-
perfect knowledge of the economy’s structure including the central bank’s inflation target.
Yet they learn perpetually and update their expectations about the structure of the model
by evaluating the observed economic shocks and their expectational errors. In this frame-
work, higher uncertainty about the central bank’s inflation target implies that inflation ex-
pectations become more sensitive to macroeconomic news. Orphanides and Williams (2005)
show that the sensitivity to macroeconomic news can be reduced by successful central bank
communication.
Demertzis and Viegi (2008, 2009) argue that an explicit inflation target provides a focal
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point for agents to form expectations when their information is imperfect. In their initial
model, expectations are formed on the basis of three aspects: Firstly, monetary authorities’
objectives and their decisions, secondly, shocks that take place after decisions are taken, and
thirdly, the average of the individuals’ expectations. Introducing a publicly communicated
target by the central bank to the model, they show that individuals will form their expecta-
tions around that target instead of basing them on the other three aspects, given the target is
sufficiently credible. Today, it is widely accepted by both, central banks and academics that
a credible inflation target can serve as an anchor for long-run inflation expectations, see e.g.
Bank of Canada (2015).
In case of uncertainty about the central bank’s inflation target, economic agents update
their expectations about future inflation in response to the new information contained in
announcements of macroeconomic key variables and monetary policy measures. By con-
trast, if the central bank’s target is credible and long-term inflation expectations are well-
anchored, they should not be sensitive to macroeconomic news. Therefore, Gu¨rkaynak et al.
(2005) proposed to test the anchoring of inflation expectations by their sensitivity to sur-
prises in macroeconomic announcements. To this end, surveys of professional or consumer
forecasts are exploited to obtain the news component of a macroeconomic announcement,
typically defined as the difference between the expected and the realized value of a variable.
In the empirical literature, evaluating the response of inflation expectations to macroeco-
nomic news has become the standard approach to test for inflation expectation anchoring.
Using U.S. data from 1990 to 2002, Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) showed that macroeconomic
news have a significant impact on medium as well as long-term inflation rates. Accord-
ingly, they conclude that U.S. inflation expectations were not entirely anchored over that
period. More recent empirical contributions suggest that, compared with inflation targeting
central banks like the ECB, inflation expectations were less anchored in the case of the Fed.
Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2010b) compare the anchoring of inflation expectations in the U.S. and the
United Kingdom (U.K.) before and after 1997, which is when the Bank of England became
independent. In line with prior research, they find that, before 1997, inflation expectations
in the U.S. and in the U.K. were similarly volatile and responsive to macroeconomic news.
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After 1997, however, the responsiveness of U.K. expectations to news strongly decreased.
Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2010b) conclude that a transparent and credible inflation-targeting policy
supports the anchoring of market participants’ perceptions of long-term inflation develop-
ment.
In line with Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2010b), the inflation targeting policy and the elaborated
communication strategy of the ECB may have contributed to a firm anchoring of inflation
expectations in the euro area, particularly before the outbreak of the financial crisis. In an
analysis of pre-crisis data, Beechey et al. (2011) find that inflation expectations react sys-
tematically to various types of surprises in the U.S., but not in the euro area. Similar re-
sults were obtained by Galati et al. (2011), who include the U.K. as well as some data (until
March 2009) from the crisis years. Galati et al. (2011) introduced structural break point tests
in order to allow for a changing degree of inflation expectations anchoring. While there
are crisis-related breaks in the news regressions for all three currencies under considera-
tion, their results confirm that euro area inflation expectations remained well-anchored in
the aftermath of the Lehman breakdown. In contrast, U.S. inflation expectations reacted
significantly more strongly to macroeconomic news after the outbreak of the financial cri-
sis. Nautz and Strohsal (2015) provide further support for a crisis-related de-anchoring of
U.S. inflation expectations. Strohsal and Winkelmann (2015) employ an exponential smooth
transition autoregressive (ESTAR) model to inflation expectations for the U.S., U.K., Swe-
den and the euro area using data until February 2011. They also confirm that the strongest
degree of anchoring can be found in the euro area, followed by the U.S., Sweden and the
U.K.
The most recent evidence on the anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area is pro-
vided by Autrup and Grothe (2014). Using data until July 2012, they allow for an exogenous
break in the degree of anchoring by splitting the observations into a pre-crisis and a crisis
sample. They confirm that long-term inflation expectations in the U.S. became more sensi-
tive to macroeconomic news in the crisis period. By contrast, euro area long-term inflation
expectations are anchored for both the pre-crisis and the crisis period.
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Overall, there is a clear consensus in the empirical literature that euro area inflation ex-
pectations have been well-anchored - at least until 2011. The question remains, however,
whether this anchoring has also survived the turbulences stirred by the ongoing European
sovereign debt crisis. In the following empirical analysis, we investigate this issue by apply-
ing multiple endogenous break point tests to euro area inflation expectations data reaching
as far as January 2015.
3. Inflation Expectations and Macroeconomic News: The Data
3.1. Measuring Inflation Expectations
The empirical literature takes data about inflation expectations either from surveys or from
break-even inflation rates derived from inflation-indexed government bonds. In the fol-
lowing, we weigh the pros and cons of both kinds of measures in order to explain why
market-based measures of inflation expectations are the more appropriate measure in our
application.
Survey-Based Measures of Inflation Expectations Surveys involving both consumers and
professional forecasters are conducted by various European institutions on a regular ba-
sis. For example, in the European Commission Consumer Survey on Inflation Expectations,
consumers are asked monthly to indicate their expectations in terms of the direction of in-
flation development over the next year. The ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)
is conducted quarterly and includes a panel of more than 70 forecast experts.3 There is no
doubt that survey measures contain valuable information and should serve as an impor-
tant benchmark for the assessment of inflation expectations. For example, recent studies
employ surveys to learn more about the rationale behind individual forecasts (Schmidt and
Nautz, 2012) as well as the determinants (Dovern et al., 2012) and the information content
(Legerstee and Franses, 2015) of forecaster disagreement. Yet, as Galati et al. (2011) already
3For a more extensive description of surveys, see ECB (2006, 2011).
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emphasized, all this information is only available on a low-frequency which makes it dif-
ficult to analyze breaks and a time-varying degree of expectations anchoring. Particularly
in a crisis period, a central bank monitoring vigilantly the credibility of its inflation target
cannot wait for a whole quarter until the next survey is available.
In addition to the low-frequency problem of surveys, there are further psychological and
sociological factors that may influence and distort the information content of surveys: As
first shown by Loftus and Palmer (1974) in an experimental environment, the response to
questionnaires is highly sensitive to the phrasing of the questions. In an application to
inflation-expectation surveys, van der Klaauw et al. (2008) found that different types of
questions may lead to different interpretations and a lower level of agreement amongst par-
ticipants. An additional distorting effect could be due to socially desirable responding, defined
as the tendency to answer in a manner that will be viewed favorable by others, in partic-
ular by the issuer of the questionnaire, see Paulhus (2002). In our application, this effect
may lead forecasters responding in line with the ECB’s target. Following Smith (1982), this
shows that survey measures might be unreliable because respondents are not obliged to act
according to their provided information. In view of these problems of survey data, the em-
pirical literature predominantly employs break-even inflation rates as a measure of inflation
expectations derived from marketable instruments.
Break-Even Inflation Rates According to the Fisher equation, the yield of a nominal bond
equals the real yield plus expected inflation. Break-even inflation (BEI) rates, often called
inflation compensation, are defined as the spread between yields of nominal and inflation-
indexed government bonds with the same maturity. An index-linked bond has a principal
value and payments which are connected to a price index, in the case of Europe the Harmo-
nized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). The BEI rate therefore reflects the rate at which the
expected real return on both bonds would be equal, given the bonds were held until matu-
rity. As a market based measure of inflation expectations, BEI rates avoid many problems
of measures taken from inflation surveys. First of all, data frequency is not an issue since
BEI rates are easily available on a daily basis. In contrast to survey-based measures, BEI
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rates are determined by market activities and actual trading behavior. Therefore, BEI rates
can be considered to represent the market’s actual inflation expectations and should not be
distorted by psychological factors, see ECB (2006). Of course, using BEI rates as a measure
of inflation expectations is also not without problems. In the following, we show how the
empirical literature using BEI rates accounts for the effects of liquidity and risk premia.
3.2. Adjusting BEI Rates for Risk
Inflation-Risk Premium The inflation-risk premium compensates investors for uncertainty
about future inflation rates and pushes BEI rates up (Gu¨rkaynak et al., 2010a). Following
Strohsal and Winkelmann (2015), this component should be considered a relevant aspect
of inflation expectations. If the inflation-risk premium is high, this suggests an elevated
level of uncertainty about future inflation and thus about long-term monetary stability. In
line with Beechey et al. (2011), we do not eliminate the inflation-risk premium since central
banks should aim to minimize this uncertainty in order to anchor inflation expectations.
Moreover, Ho¨rdahl (2008, pp. 23-38) argues that inflation-risk premia are often found to be
small and fairly stable, implying that their impact on daily changes in BEI rates should be
negligible.
Liquidity Premium A liquidity premium is demanded by investors if a security cannot eas-
ily be converted into cash. Since inflation-indexed bonds are usually traded less frequently
than nominal bonds, liquidity premia could be important for the development of BEI rates.
The liquidity premium component lowers the extracted inflation expectations. Liquidity
effects should be particularly pronounced in a crisis period when financial markets experi-
ence great fluctuations in volatility and liquidity, see Galati et al. (2011). Consequently, in an
analysis of recent euro area BEI rates, liquidity effects cannot be ignored.
Following Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2010a), the empirical literature accounts for liquidity effects
by using a pre-regression of BEI rates on liquidity control variables. In line with e.g. Strohsal
and Winkelmann (2015), we regress the BEI rate, BEIR, on a corporate bond spread and a
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volatility proxy:
BEIRt = γ+ δ1spreadt + δ2VIXt + ft (1)
The control variable spreadt is the difference between an AAA-rated corporate bond yield
and the yield of a nominal government bond. For both types of securities, the credit risk
component is considered to be near zero, so that differences in the bond yields should be
based on differences in liquidity in both markets. According to Christensen and Gillan
(2012), the corporate spread represents a reasonable instrument in (1) because liquidity pre-
mia are usually correlated across nominal and real markets. VIXt is the VSTOXX volatility
index, which serves as a proxy for market volatility. More detailed information about the
data and the results of the adjustment equation (1) is provided in the Appendix. The residual
term of equation (1), ft, represents the liquidity-adjusted BEI rate for this particular sample
and is used in the subsequent analysis as the measure of long-term inflation expectations.
3.3. Spot Versus Forward Break-Even Rates
The literature distinguishes between spot and forward break-even rates of inflation. Spot rates
refer to securities that are purchased and exchanged right away (on the spot). The 10-year
break-even spot rate, for example, is a measure of the average expected inflation rate over
the next 10 years. This implies that the 10-year spot rate also reflects short-term expectations
of inflation rates over the next year, the year thereafter and so on, since these values enter the
average. As a result, spot rates are found to be strongly affected by short-term shocks and are
more volatile than forward rates, see ECB (2012a). Inflation targets and, thus, the relevant
expectations horizon refer to the medium and long run. As a consequence, forward rates
are a more suitable measure of long-run inflation expectations. Forwards are contracted
today but refer to a rate in the future. For instance, the 5-year forward rate 5 years ahead
represents the yield of a 5-year bond starting in 5 years (and ending in 10 years) agreed on
today. Far-ahead forward rates hence eliminate the influence of short-term fluctuations and
should be closely linked to the inflation target.
In our empirical analysis, we use 5-year forward BEI rates 5 years ahead for investigating
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expectations anchoring in the euro area. This particular forward maturity is predominantly
used both in practice (ECB, 2012a) and in the empirical literature. The data are taken from
the European Central Bank and Bloomberg, see Appendix A.
5-year forward BEI rates 5 years ahead (BEIR) are derived as follows:
BEIRt =
(
(1 + r10)10
(1 + r5)5
) 1
10−5
− 1 , (2)
where ri represents the BEI spot rate with maturity of i years.
Taking logs provides a more intuitive interpretation of the forward rate as the average
expected inflation rate over the period that starts in 5 years and then lasts for 5 years:
BEIRt ≈ 15 (10r10 − 5r5) . (3)
The break-even inflation rate (BEIR) is shown in Figure 1. Note that the break-even rate is
Figure 1 Long-Run Forward Break-Even Inflation Rate in the Euro Area
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3.0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Notes: The figure shows the 5-year forward break-even inflation rate 5 years ahead with respect
to the Harmonized Consumer Price Index.
above but close to the ECB’s target of 2%. Inflation expectations went up during the height
of the financial crisis, until 2009, and have been going down persistently thereafter, reaching
their lowest value on 6th January 2015. Figure 1 also suggests that the volatility of inflation
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expectations has increased recently. According to Galati et al. (2011), more volatile inflation
expectations can be an indicator of a lower degree of anchoring.
3.4. Macroeconomic News Variables
In line with the literature, we estimate the impact of macroeconomic news to determine
the degree of anchoring of inflation expectations. Realizations of economic variables are
released on a monthly or quarterly basis. Around one week before each data release, pro-
fessionals provide their forecasts about the surveyed variables. Since the predicted com-
ponent of the news variable should be priced in at the data release date, it should have no
effect on inflation expectations in any case (Gu¨rkaynak et al., 2010b). By contrast, the news
component of a macroeconomic announcement, calculated as the difference between the ac-
tual release value and the median forecast, may affect de-anchored inflation expectations.
Surprises are realized on the date the value of the underlying variable is published by the
officials. On non-publication dates, surprises are set to zero.
Our set of macroeconomic news variables include measures on economic activity (GDP,
industrial production, unemployment rate, trade balance with non-EU), prices (CPI, PPI)
and government expenditure in the euro area. In line with the empirical literature, the proxy
for the monetary policy surprise is based on the three-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate
(Euribor). The Euribor should not respond to the anticipated component of central bank an-
nouncements. The ECB publishes its monetary policy decisions once a month, usually at the
first Thursday, at 1.45pm central European time (CET). Since the Euribor is published daily
at 11.00am CET, the change of the Euribor on the day after a monetary policy announcement
should capture reactions to monetary surprises. More information about the news data is
given in the Appendix.
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4. The Anchoring of Inflation Expectations in the Euro Area:
Empirical Results
4.1. Do Inflation Expectations Respond to Macroeconomic News?
In order to investigate the anchoring of euro area inflation expectations we regress the
change of liquidity-adjusted BEI forward rates on a set of macroeconomic news variables,
collected in the vector Xt:
∆ ft = α+ βXt + et, (4)
where t indexes days and the dependent variable ∆ ft = ft− ft−1 represents the daily change
in the liquidity-adjusted 5-year forward BEI rate 5 years ahead. If inflation expectations are
well-anchored, ∆ ft will not react to Xt implying that β will be small and insignificant. In
contrast, significant β-coefficients would indicate responsiveness of inflation expectations
to macroeconomic news, suggesting a lack of anchoring.
In a first step of our analysis, we assume a constant degree of anchoring and, thus, con-
duct the news-regression for the entire sample period, January 2006 to January 2015. The
results are presented in Table 1. According to these preliminary results, inflation expecta-
Table 1 The Anchoring of Inflation Expectations in the Euro Area: Results from News
Regressions without a Break
sample GDP IP UER TB CPI PPI GEP Euribor joint test R2
01/03/2006 - 0.010 -0.005 -0.068 -0.005 -0.009 -0.027 0.029 0.395 1.456 0.005
01/30/2015 (0.72) (0.43) (0.23) (0.11) (0.26) (0.26) (0.30) (0.06) (0.17)
Notes: Least-squares estimation of ∆ ft = α+ βXt + et with p-values based on Newey-West standard errors
given in parentheses. The news variables are: GDP, industrial production (IP), unemployment rate (UER),
trade balance (TB), consumer price index (CPI), producer price index (PPI) and government expenditure
(GEP). Euribor changes measure monetary policy surprises. The joint test statistic, with p-value in parenthe-
ses, refers to the null hypothesis that all news-coefficients are equal to zero.
tions have been reasonably well-anchored in the euro area over the whole sample period.
Each individual macroeconomic news variable as well as the test statistic for a joint effect of
all news variables are insignificant and the R2 is as small as 0.5%. The major exception refers
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to the Euribor surprise (p-value of 0.06), indicating some sensitivity of long-term inflation
expectations to monetary policy announcements.
4.2. Is the Degree of Inflation Expectations Anchoring Constant over Time?
Credibility can be gained but it can also be lost. In particular, the degree of anchoring of
inflation expectations might not be constant over time. In order to investigate whether the
anchoring of European inflation expectations has survived the sovereign debt-crisis, regres-
sion (4) should be allowed to exhibit structural breaks implying time-varying parameters.
In order to investigate the parameter stability issue, we apply endogenous break point tests.
In order to allow for multiple breaks in the way euro area inflation expectations respond
to news, we use the Bai (1997) sequential test as well as the Bai and Perron (1998) test which
combines the sequential with a global approach. A convenient feature of these tests is that
they are based on a Wald-statistic which allows to use robust variance-covariance estima-
tors. In the empirical analysis, our inference is based on Newey-West autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity consistent (HAC) standard errors. Since the data used in this analysis
cover the years from 2006 to 2015, they include four possible regimes: pre-crisis, financial
crisis, sovereign debt crisis and a potential recovery phase. Therefore, we allow for a maxi-
mum of three structural breaks. Further details on the multiple break point test methodol-
ogy are provided in Appendix C.
The results of the endogenous break point tests are shown in Table 2. For both tests,
there is a minimum number of observations per regime. The results shown are based on
the standard trimming percentage of 15%, i.e. 7.5% of the data are cut off at each end of the
sample. It is worth emphasizing, however, that our results do not depend on that choice.
Note that the consistency of the test results is high, both regarding the number of significant
breaks and their timing. In line with earlier evidence on the anchoring of Euro inflation
expectations, both test variants do not find a significant break at the outbreak of the financial
crisis in 2008. However, the break point tests do agree on a significant break point at the
beginning of September 2011 when the European sovereign debt crisis has already unfolded.
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Moreover, neither the sequential Bai (1997) nor the combined Bai and Perron (1998) test
indicates the existence of a second (or third) break. This suggests that the new anchoring
regime of euro area inflation expectations that has started in late 2011 still continues.
Table 2 Tests of Time-Invariant Degree of Inflation Expectations Anchoring
test 5% crit. test 10% crit.
test variant breaks break date stat. value breaks stat. value
Bai (1997) 1 09/01/2011 24.22 23.70 2 15.85† 23.62
5.57†† 23.62
Bai and Perron (1998) 1 09/06/2011 24.22 23.70 2 15.85 23.62
3 11.53 24.74
Notes: The sequential Bai (1997) test searches in the subsamples before and after
09/01/2011 for a second break. †Most significant test statistic for a break before
09/01/2011. ††Most significant test statistic for a break after 09/01/2011. In the combined
test of Bai and Perron (1998), the timing for all breaks under the alternative hypothesis
is determined by a global search and subsequently the most likely additional break date
is tested for significance. A 15% trimming has applied to all test variants. Critical values
are taken from Bai and Perron (2003b).
4.3. How Did the Break in the News-Regression Affect the Anchoring of
Inflation Expectations?
Table 3 shows the results from the news regression over the two sub-periods indicated by
the break tests. The estimation confirms that break-even rates did not react significantly
to news in the first sub-sample, i.e. before the break point at 09/01/2011. The the test of
joint significance of all regressors does not reject the irrelevance of macroeconomic news
for inflation expectations and the coefficient of determination is only 0.4%. This result is
perfectly in line with earlier findings of e.g. Autrup and Grothe (2014) and Strohsal and
Winkelmann (2015). In particular, it is confirmed that inflation expectations in the euro area
remained well-anchored during the financial crisis in 2008.
From September 2011 onwards, however, we obtain a different picture. Table 3 shows
a clear de-anchoring of inflation expectations in the second period, i.e. from 09/01/2011
to 01/30/2015. This de-anchoring is reflected in significant responses to several macroeco-
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nomic news. The joint test is significant at any conventional confidence level and the R2
increased from 0.4% to 2.6%. This suggests that the ongoing sovereign debt crisis led to a
destabilization of inflation expectations.
Table 3 The (De-)Anchoring of Inflation Expectations in the Euro Area: Results from
News Regressions with a Single Break
period GDP IP UER TB CPI PPI GEP Euribor joint test R2
01/03/2006 - 0.005 -0.003 -0.018 -0.006 0.039 0.016 0.000 0.052 0.827 0.004
08/31/2011 (0.86) (0.68) (0.78) (0.04) (0.61) (0.22) (0.99) (0.70) (0.58)
09/01/2011 - 0.013 -0.007 -0.171 -0.003 -0.391 -0.137 0.229 1.276 3.814 0.026
01/30/2015 (0.88) (0.50) (0.09) (0.67) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: The time-varying impact of macroeconomic news on inflation expectations. The
joint test statistic, with p-value in parentheses, refers to the null hypothesis that all news-
coefficients are equal to zero. For more information, see Table 1 (notation and statistics),
Table 2 (break point analysis), and Table 4 in Appendix A (data).
The absence of significant second break indicates that euro area inflation expectations
have not been re-anchored ever since. It is worth noting that the most likely second break
(which is, however, insignificant even at the 10% confidence level) is found before, not after
2011, compare Table 2. The break test statistic (5.57) corresponding to the most likely break
in the post-2011 period is even less significant.
5. Conclusion
Before the financial crisis, the performance of the ECB was viewed with general satisfaction.
In line with the ECB’s commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy,
its achievements in curbing inflation and anchoring expectations contributed to the credi-
bility of monetary policy in the euro area. Based on data up till July 2012, several empirical
contributions, including Beechey et al. (2011), Galati et al. (2011) and Autrup and Grothe
(2014) confirmed that inflation expectations are well-anchored in the euro area since they do
not respond sensitively to economic news.
In the course of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, however, concerns were raised that
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euro area inflation expectations became de-anchored. On the one hand, due to substantial
quantitative easing and prolonged low interest rate levels, the ECB could face problems of
inflation in the longer-run. On the other hand, current inflation rates close to zero could also
lead to severe downward corrections of long-term inflation expectations.
This paper provides new evidence on the anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro
area. In accordance with earlier studies, we find that euro area inflation expectations were
well-anchored until fall 2011. Since then, however, it is revealed that long-term inflation ex-
pectations are less anchored and respond significantly to macroeconomic news. The results
obtained from multiple endogenous break tests suggest that euro area inflation expectations
have remained de-anchored ever since. Our empirical results indicate that the continuation
of the sovereign debt crisis has not only raised serious concerns about the integrity of the
euro area, but it may also have increased the uncertainty about the monetary policy strategy
of the ECB and, particularly, the relevance of the inflation target.
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A. Data: Sources and Definitions
Table 4 provides more information on the employed data. Macroeconomic news variables
obtained from the Bloomberg surveys are computed by comparing the realized values of the
variables to the corresponding survey medians, see Section 3.4.
Table 4 Data
Abbreviation Variable Explanation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
(news component)
market value of all goods and services
produced in the euro area, source:
Bloomberg
IP Industrial Production
(news component)
volume of mining and producing in-
dustry as well as public supply of
electricity, gas and water, source:
Bloomberg
UER Rate of Unemployment
(news component)
average value of the entire euro area,
source: Bloomberg
TB Trade Balance with Non-
EU (news component)
difference between export and import,
source: Bloomberg
CPI Harmonized Consumer
Price Index (news com-
ponent)
yearly change of the price of a basket of
goods and services, consumed by the
average European consumer, source:
Bloomberg
PPI Producer Price Index
(news component)
change of the price of goods when
leaving their place of production,
source: Bloomberg
GEP Government Expenditure
(news component)
part of the GDP that is spent by the
government, source: Bloomberg
Euribor Euro Interbank Offered
Rate
change of the three-month Euribor at
monetary policy announcement days,
source: Bloomberg
BEIR 5-Year Forward BEI Rate
5 Years Ahead
market-based measure of inflation ex-
pectations, source: Jan 2006 to Feb
2012, ECB, Mar 2012 to Jan 2015,
Bloomberg
spread corporate bond spread the spread between an AAA-rated cor-
porate bond yield and the the yield of
a nominal government bond, source:
Datastream, ECB
VSTOXX EURO STOXX 50 Volatil-
ity index
a measure of the implied volatility of
the EURO STOXX 50 index referring to
the next 30 days, source: Bloomberg
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Figure 2 Macroeconomic News in the Euro Area
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Notes: The figure shows the realizations of the news variables, cf. Table 4.
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B. Liquidity Adjustment of BEI Rates
Table 5 presents the results of the liquidity adjustment regression (1)
BEIR = γ+ δ1spreadt + δ2VIXt + ft
described in section 3.2. The estimated coefficients of the liquidity measures for the 5-year
forward rate 5 years ahead (BEIR) are both highly significant and plausibly signed.
Table 5 The Liquidity Adjustment Regression of the BEI Rate
constant spread VIX joint test R2
coefficient 2.091 0.232 0.003 60.132 0.048
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: p-values are based on Newey-West het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent stan-
dard errors. For more information on the data, see Ap-
pendix A.
C. Multiple Endogenous Structural Break Point Tests
The break point tests are based on the methodology of Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998).
The sequential Bai (1997) test starts by searching for the most likely break in the sample.
If this break is significant, the procedure is repeated for both new subsamples. The testing
procedure stops when the null of no additional break cannot be rejected for the first time.
The Bai and Perron (1998) test combines the sequential procedure of Bai (1997) with a global
break point search according to
l+1
∑
i=1
Ti
∑
t=Ti−1+1
(∆ ft − αˆ− βˆiXt)2 , (5)
which is conducted under the alternative hypothesis. The test statistic is given by
F(T1, ..., Tt; q) =
1
T
(
T − (l + 1)q− p
l
)
βˆ′R′(RVˆ(βˆ)R′)−1Rβˆ (6)
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with T0 = 0 and Tl+1 = T. V(βˆ) is a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
estimate of the covariance matrix of breaking regression coefficients. Rβˆ = (βˆ1
′ − βˆ2′ − ...−
βˆl
′− ˆβl+1′) and R is defined accordingly. q and p stand for the numbers of breaking and non-
breaking coefficients, respectively. Bai and Perron (2003a) propose an efficient algorithm to
reduce the computational burden of the global search. Simulated critical values are provided
by Bai and Perron (2003b). For a more comprehensive discussion of multiple break tests, see
Perron (2006).
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